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Abstract.
The present paper analyzes multi-player contests where participants com-
pete for a valuable prize and their probability of victory depends on the dif-
ference between their effective efforts. These difference-form contests have ap-
pealing properties but remain largely understudied due to the non-existence of
pure-strategy equilibria and the preemption effect they display (e.g. Che and
Gale, 2000). We show that these features rest critically on the assumption of
full linearity. Pure strategy equilibria with multiple active contestants exist
under mild conditions as soon as full linearity is assumed away. In addition,
we show that symmetric difference-form contests are equilibrium equivalent to
rank-order tournaments à la Lazear and Rosen (1981) and characterize the
level of total expenditures as a function of the heterogeneity in participants’
valuations of victory.
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1. Introduction
Contests are present in many areas of human affairs. In military conflicts, patent
races, tournaments within organizations and sport competitions, participants strive
to obtain a valuable object, rent or award. In these settings, contenders often expend
staggering amounts of resources. Economists are naturally interested in contests both
because of their allocative implications and their impact on social welfare.1
The outcome of real-world contests is typically stochastic. Contest theory has
modelled this randomness by assuming specific functional forms describing the rule al-
locating the prize contested based on the contenders’effort to acquire it. One family of
these success functions is the ubiquitous Tullock or ratio-form (Tullock, 1967; 1980),
which assumes that winning probabilities are proportional to contenders’ efforts.2
Another, less frequently used, family of success functions assumes that participants’
winning probabilities depend on the difference between their efforts. These difference-
form contests (Hirshleifer, 1989; 1991) present two distinctive features which can be
appealing in many applications.
The first one is that contenders can enjoy a positive winning probability despite
making zero effort.3 Hirshleifer (1991; 2000) argued that this feature appears in
contests with severe frictions, such as naval warfare4 or union-management conflicts
because, even when the union is very powerful, it is in its interest to keep the firm
in business. By the same token, difference-form success functions are also well-suited
to study lobbying within organizations (Milgrom, 1988) or federations (Wärneryd,
1998) where passive actors may still receive transfers from their managers or federal
governments.
The second distinctive feature of difference-form contests is that a player can win
with certainty if she overpowers her rivals by a high enough margin.5 This is the case
when one participant is overwhelmingly superior to the other in military conflicts (e.g.
the US invasion of the tiny island of Grenada) or to all other candidates in hiring
competitions (e.g. a Nobel prize laureate applying for a job in a average academic
department). Because of this feature, difference-form contests are closely related to
all-pay auctions.6
1For excellent surveys of the contest literature see Konrad (2009) and Corchón and Serena (2018).
2See Skaperdas (1996) for an axiomatic study of the ratio-form.
3In contrast, under the standard ratio-form, such contender would lose with certainty unless
every other contender bid zero.
4Severe storms almost obliterated the Persian navy in 480 BC, the Mongol navy in 1281 and
the Spanish Armada in 1588; as a result, Greece, Japan and England respectively prevailed despite
exerting virtually zero effort.
5Under the ratio form, victory is certain only when one contender makes any positive effort whilst
the rest of contenders make zero effort.
6Che and Gale (2000) show that the mixed-strategy equilibria of two-player linear difference-form
contests converge to that of the all-pay auction as the success function becomes infinitely sensitive
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However, despite their appealing properties and their well-studied microfounda-
tions7, difference-form contests remain under-studied.8 For instance, no paper has
investigated yet the equilibria of these contests with more than two players. This is
mainly due to two reasons. First, generalizing the difference-form success function to
a multi-player setting is non-trivial. We solved this issue in a previous paper (Cubel
and Sanchez-Pages, 2016) where we axiomatically characterized such functional form.
Second, early results showed that difference-form contests display two unsavory fea-
tures when contenders are heterogeneous: A pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist
when one player values victory suffi ciently more than the other and, when it exists,
at most one contestant is active (Baik, 1998). Che and Gale (2000) conjectured that
this preemption effect is the result of the restriction to pure-strategy equilibria.9
In the present paper, we generalise the difference-form contests studied in Che
and Gale (2000) to more than two players and beyond full linearity. We show that,
under quite mild conditions, a pure strategy equilibrium of the generalized difference-
form contest exist with multiple contestants expending positive effort. In addition,
we provide a thorough study of the properties of these contests. First, we show that
there exists an equilibrium equivalence between symmetric difference-form contests
and rank-order tournaments à la Lazear and Rosen (1981). Second, we characterize
the equilibrium level of total expenditures as a function of the inequality of players’
valuations of victory. Finally, we explore the mixed equilibria that emerge in the
region of the parameter space where these contests have no pure strategy equilibria.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we in-
troduce the difference-form contest success function. Section 3 provides preliminary
results connecting our paper with Che and Gale (2000). We provide plenty of exam-
ples throughout to facilitate understanding. Section 4 constitutes the main part of
the analysis and characterizes the existence of pure strategy equilibria where multiple
contenders are active. Section 5 explores the relationship between heterogeneity and
total contest expenditures and studies mixed-strategies. Section 6 concludes.
to the difference of contenders’efforts.
7Gersbach and Haller (2009) show that a difference-form contest success function (CSF) is the
result of an intra-household bargaining game. Corchon and Dahm (2010, 2011), Polishchuk and
Tonis (2013) and Beviá and Corchon (2019) microfound the difference-form CSF as the outcome of
optimal mechanism design. Skaperdas and Vaydia (2012) show that a difference-form CSF can be
derived from a Bayesian framework.
8Applications of difference-form sucess functions include Bush and Mayer (1974), Garfinkel
(1990), Levine and Smith (1995), Grossman and Helpman (1996), Rohner (2006), Besley and Pers-
son (2008, 2009), Gartzke and Rohner (2011), Munster and Staal (2011), Cardona and Rubi-Barcelo
(2016) and Skaperdas, Toukan and Vaidya (2016).
9"[I]t is unclear whether this passivity is a result of the restriction to pure-strategy equilibria,"
(Che and Gale, 2000, p. 24).
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2. Basics
Consider a community of n ≥ 2 individuals indexed by i. These individuals are
engaged in a competition only one of them can win. Examples include R&D races,
military conflicts, labour tournaments, political campaigns or sport contests. Each
contestant spends effort xi ≥ 0 in order to alter in their favor the outcome of the
contest. Denote by x = {x1, ..., xn} the vector of individual efforts. We will say that
a player is active if xi > 0 and inactive otherwise.
2.1. The generalized difference-form success function. A contest success
function (CSF) p : Rn+ → ∆n maps each vector of individual efforts x into a vector
of individual winning probabilities.







(xi − xj), 1}, 0}. (1)
Note that this function imposes bounds to ensure p1(x)+p2(x) = 1 and pi(x) ≥ 0.
Otherwise, if player i’s effort were low enough, i.e. xi < xj − 1β , or high enough,
i.e. xi > xj + 1β , her winning probability would become negative or step above one
respectively. These bounds also imply that the success function satisfies the two
aforementioned features, that is, a player is not necessarily bound for defeat if she
exerts zero effort and any player can guarantee her victory if she overpowers her
opponent by a suffi ciently large margin.
Generalizing this success function beyond the two-player case is not trivial if the
success function is to maintain these features whilst generating a proper probability
distribution across contenders. In a previous paper of ours (Cubel and Sanchez-
Pages, 2016), we axiomatized one functional form that satisfies all these properties
and generalizes the Che and Gale (2000) success function to the n-player case. We
next introduce it.
Let us first order the elements of the vector of efforts in x such that xi ≥ xi+1 for









f(xj) for i = 1, ..., n∗
0 otherwise
(2)



















For the sake of clarity, it is important to examine this functional form in more
detail before proceeding any further.
The first remarkable feature of the CSF in (2) is that not all players enjoy a positive
winning probability for a given x; only the players with the n∗ highest impacts where
n∗ is determined as in (3). One player attains victory with certainty, i.e. n∗ = 1,
when f(x1) > f(x2) + 1. On the other hand, all players enjoy a positive winning









When there are two players and the impact function is of the form f(xi) = βxi,
the difference-form CSF in (2) boils down to the CSF in Che and Gale (2000) where
the definition of n∗ in (3) replaces the bounds imposed in (1). Our functional form
thus generalizes their success function to the case of n players.
The second feature of the generalized difference-form CSF is that the winning
probability of a player i ≤ n∗ is a function of the difference between her impact and
the average impact of all players who enjoy a positive winning probability. If all
players i ≤ n∗ have the same impact (e.g. zero), their winning probability is just 1
n∗ .
The third main feature of this CSF is that, unlike the one in Che and Gale (2000),
it does not impose a linear relationship between effort and impact.10 As Cubel and
Sanchez-Pages (2016) show, different impact functions can accommodate different
types of effort invariance, a property which might be desirable in certain applications.
More specifically, the linear impact function à la Che and Gale (2000) is the only one
that ensures that the contest success function in (2) is translation invariant ; that
is, that winning probabilities do not change when all efforts increase by the same
fixed amount.11 This is a desirable property when the prize is allocated based on
an absolute criterion, such as in promotion contests where a worker’s performance
must be above his colleagues’. On the other hand, the logarithmic impact function,
i.e. f(xi) = β lnxi, is the only function which ensures that winning probabilities are
scale invariant (i.e. homogeneous of degree zero), a desirable property when relative
efforts matter or when efforts are measured in monetary units.
An example will be useful at this point to fix ideas before proceeding any further.
Example 1: Linear impact. Suppose n = 3. Fix the vector of efforts to be
x = (2, 1, 0) and the impact function to be linear, i.e. f(xi) = βxi. The CSF is thus
translation invariant. Let us first determine n∗ given x. It is the case that n∗ = 3 if
10The literature on difference-form contests has followed this assumption with the exception of
Skaperdas and Vaidya (2012), Polishchuk and Tonis (2013) and Skaperdas et al. (2016).













− β > 0,
that is, if and only if β < 1
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− β)). It is the














that is, if and only if β ∈ [1
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, 0). Finally, player 1 attains a sure
victory, i.e. n∗ = 1 and p = (1, 0, 0), when β ≥ 1. Note that the effectiveness of effort
β is crucial to determine the set of contenders with positive winning probability; as
the impact function becomes more sensitive to disparities in efforts, i.e. as β increases,
more players are bound to lose the contest with certainty.
2.2. The contest game. Efforts in the contest are costly. Their cost is given by
a non-negative, strictly increasing, weakly convex and twice differentiable function
c : R+ → R+ which is assumed to satisfy c(0) = 0. Like the vast majority of the
contest theory literature, Che and Gale (2000) assume the cost of effort to be linear.
Whilst this is a convenient assumption that makes contest games more tractable,
it is unsatisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, because the marginal cost of effort is
likely to increase rapidly when effort requires time, foregone production possibilities
or when capital markets are imperfect. Second, because this seemingly innocuous
assumption drives results such as the group-size paradox (Esteban and Ray, 2001)
and the preemption effect result in difference-form contests (Baik, 1998; Che and
Gale, 2000), as we will show below.
Individuals value their victory in the contest by vi ≥ 0. This is the value contender
i attaches to the prize, rent or award contenders are competing for. Without loss of
generality, let us order players decreasingly by their valuation of victory, i.e. v1 ≥
v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn. Note that this ordering, together with how we laid out the success
function in (2) means that we are implicitly assuming that individuals with higher
valuations of victory make higher efforts. As it will become clear in the analysis
below, this must be the case in equilibrium.
To conclude, individuals choose their contest effort xi in order to maximize
ui(x) = pi(x)vi − c(xi), (4)
taking as given the effort of their opponents. Note that we are normalizing the
valuation of defeat to zero; this is without loss of generality as vi can be interpreted
also as the difference between the valuations of victory and defeat.
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We devote the following sections to characterize the Nash equilibria of this contest
game. We will refer to this simply as the equilibrium. Before that, let us state a result
which will prove useful in the ensuing analysis.
Denote by n∗∗ the amount of active players under effort profile x. Note that under
a standard Tullock-type CSF it is always the case that n∗ = n∗∗. The next Lemma
describes the relationship between n∗∗ and n∗ under the difference-form CSF.
Lemma 1. For any effort vector x such that n∗∗ < n it must be that n∗ ∈ {n∗∗, n}.
Proof. Obviously, it cannot be that an active player enjoys a zero winning proba-
bility in equilibrium, i.e. n∗ < n∗∗. If that were the case, that player would be better
off by remaining inactive. Hence, n∗ ≥ n∗∗. Assume now that n∗ ∈ (n∗∗, n) so that












f(0) > 0 ⇔






















leading to a contradiction.
3. First results
In this section, we study two basic versions of the contest game set up above. First,
we explore the fully linear case which generalizes Che and Gale (2000) to n players.
Second, we relax the full linearity assumption but assume instead that players value
victory equally. There we show that an arbitrarily small departure from the fully
linear case restores the existence of pure strategy equilibria free of the preemption
effect. Before concluding the section, we show that there is an equilibrium equivalence
between symmetric generalized difference-form contests and rank-order tournaments
à la Lazear and Rosen (1981).
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3.1. Full linearity. The set up in Che and Gale (2000) corresponds to the case
where both the impact function and the cost function are linear, i.e. f(xi) = βxi and
c(xi) = xi. Assuming that player i is active in equilibrium, the first order condition






vi − 1 = 0. (5)
First, note that because the success function is separable in contenders’impacts,
the optimal individual effort choice does not depend directly on the effort of her
opponents. Second, observe that, for a given n∗, a player is either willing to supply
an arbitrarily large amount of effort or zero effort. Whether it is one case or the other
depends on the player’s valuation satisfying
vi ≥
n∗
β(n∗ − 1) . (6)
If this condition holds, the marginal benefit of effort exceeds its marginal cost and
the contestant is willing to exert as much effort as necessary to win the contest with
probability one. This implies that no equilibrium in pure strategies can exist when
two players have a suffi ciently high valuation of victory. On the other hand, if player
1 does not value victory enough, the only possible equilibrium is one where no player
is active. These intuitive results are formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 [Equilibria of the linear case]. If v1 < nβ(n−1) no contender is ac-
tive in equilibrium. Otherwise, a pure strategy equilibrium exists if and only if v2 < 2β .
In that equilibrium, only player 1 is active and wins the contest with probability one.
Proof. Consider first the case where v1 < nβ(n−1) . There it is clear that all agents
being inactive is an equilibrium. This equilibrium is unique because n
∗
β(n∗−1) is de-
creasing in n∗ so if v1 < nβ(n−1) , no player has any incentive to make positive effort
for any n∗ ≤ n.
Consider now the case where v1 ≥ nβ(n−1) . Assume that in equilibrium at least one
player exerts positive effort and n∗ ≥ 2. Note that if player i makes positive effort
in that equilibrium then all players j < i should also exert positive effort since (6)
holds for them too. So if n∗ ≥ 2 it must be that player 1 is active together with all
players for who vi ≥ n
∗
β(n∗−1) . But this cannot be a pure strategy equilibrium because
then player 1 could profitably deviate by increasing her effort, at least up to the point
where the number of contenders with positive probability drops from n∗ to n∗ − 1.
Therefore, there are only two remaining possible equilibria. Either one where all
players are inactive and thus n∗ = n, or one where player 1 is the only active player
8
and n∗ = 1, as recall that it cannot be an equilibrium with n∗ = 1 where at least two
players exert positive effort.
Consider the candidate equilibrium where all players remain inactive. Player 1
earns there a payoffof v1
n
. She can choose to deviate and earn payoffu1 = max{1, ( 1n+
β n−1
n










when v1 > nβ(n−1) . So we are left with the candidate equilibrium where only player 1
is active and wins the contest with probability one. Again, it must be that x1 = 1β .
Consider a potential deviation x′2 by player 2. Note that if player 2 increases her
effort, even slightly, then n∗ = 2. Hence, the derivative of player 2’s payoff function








which is non-negative if and only if v2 ≥ 2β . Hence, such an equilibrium can survive if
and only if v2 < 2β . Thus, it is the only equilibrium in pure strategies when v1 >
n
β(n−1) .
This proposition generalizes Proposition 2 in Che and Gale (2000) to the case
of n-players.12 It shows that a fully linear difference-form contest cannot have an
equilibrium in pure strategies unless the player with the second highest valuation of
victory remains inactive because her valuation is too low. Moreover, in any pure
strategy equilibrium, at most one player is active. This is what Che and Gale (2000)
call the preemption effect, previously observed by Hirshleifer (1989) and Baik (1998).
Because the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of effort are constant, contestants
with a suffi ciently high valuation of victory would like to spend as much effort as
possible. This breaks down any pure strategy equilibria with at least two active
contenders.
Proposition 1 also implies that a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist under full
linearity when players have the same valuation of victory, i.e. vi = v for all i. Next,
we show that this is no longer true as soon as we move away from full linearity.
3.2. The symmetric case. Let us now depart from full linearity and characterize
the equilibrium of the contest game when players’valuations of victory are identical,
i.e. vi = v for all i. We show that either none or all players are active in any pure
strategy equilibrium. Then we show that this symmetric difference-form contest is
equilibrium equivalent to rank-order tournaments as in Lazear and Rosen (1981).
12Note that when n = 2, conditions in Proposition 1 boil down to the conditions in the text and
proof of Proposition 2 in Che and Gale (2000, p. 27) after noting that their parameter s = β2 .
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The equilibrium. Assume that the impact function f(xi) is strictly increasing,
twice differentiable and weakly concave. Assume also that the cost function c(xi)
satisfies all the assumptions posited in Section 2.2. When all players share the same






vf́ ′(xi)− c′(xi) = 0. (7)
The separability of the contest success function implies that in any pure strategy
equilibrium where at least a subset of players are making positive effort all must be






Given our assumptions, h(xi) is non-decreasing and satisfies h(0) ≥ 0. In particu-
lar, if either c′′ > 0 or f ′′ < 0 (or both), that is, if we depart from the fully linear case
albeit slightly, the function h(xi) is strictly increasing and invertible and a solution
to (7) exists.
Denote the solution to (7) as




This is the optimal effort choice of contestant i when n∗ players enjoy a positive




The next proposition characterizes the pure strategy equilibria when players have
identical valuations.
Proposition 2 [Equilibria of the symmetric case]. Assume that h(xi) is strictly
increasing. If v < n
n−1h(0) no contender is active in equilibrium. Otherwise, all con-
testants must be active in any pure strategy equilibrium and the equilibrium must












Proof. It is clear that all players must remain inactive in any equilibrium if
v < n
n−1h(0) as no contestant would have an incentive to exert effort then.
Assume now that v ≥ n
n−1h(0). Suppose that there exists an equilibrium where
n∗ < n players enjoy a positive winning probability. Then, by Lemma 1, it must be
that n∗ = n∗∗. However, this implies that for the active contestants, i.e. i ≤ n∗∗,
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it must be that v ≥ n∗∗




n∗∗−1h(0) holds. A contradiction. By the same token, this implies that it must
be that n∗∗ = n∗ = n in any pure strategy equilibrium.
Still, v ≥ n
n−1h(0) is only a necessary condition for the existence of a symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium where all contenders are active. The reason is that the
level of effort in the purported interior symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium x̃(n) =
h−1(v n−1
n
) might be so high that a contender i could be better off by remaining
inactive. That is why we need to derive further conditions ensuring that ui(x̃(n)) ≥
ui(0, x̃−i(n)).
First, note that pi(0, x̃−i(n)) ≥ 0 when f(x̃(n)) ≤ f(0) + 1n−1 . Now observe that
u′i(0, x̃−i(n)) = v
n−1
n
f ′(0) − c′(0) ≥ 0 given that v ≥ n
n−1h(0) holds by assumption.
Hence, contestant i does not prefer to deviate and become inactive in that case.
The second case emerges when f(x̃(n)) > f(0) + 1
n−1 . Now, pi(0, x̃−i(n)) =
p′i(0, x̃−i(n)) = 0 and u
′
i(0, x̃−i(n
∗)) ≤ 0. We must then compare the payoff from
deviating, i.e. ui(0, x̃−i(n)) = 0, with the payoff from sticking to the purported













where note that c−1(v/n) leaves contestants indifferent between being inactive and
being active when all players, including the contestant, exert effort c−1(v/n).
Recall that we are in the case where f(x̃(n)) > f(0) + 1








So we only need (9) to hold when (10) does as well. This yields the conditions
stated in the text of the proposition. Before concluding the proof, observe that in
the fully linear case h(xi) = 1β the conditions for the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium with all contestants being active cannot be satisfied generically.
Proposition 2 shows that a pure strategy equilibrium of the symmetric case can
exist where all players are active. This result is in sharp contrast with the fully linear
case, where both players remain inactive in any pure strategy equilibrium under
symmetric valuations . This contrast will become even starker when we analyze the
asymmetric valuations case in Section 4.
For this pure strategy equilibrium to exist, the valuation of victory should not
be too high or the marginal benefit of effort should not be too high relative to its
marginal cost. Otherwise, contestants would invest so aggressively, i.e. x̃(n) would
be so high, that they would obtain a negative payoff in that equilibrium and would
11
Figure 1: Best response functions for the symmetric case with n = 2 and linear
impact.
prefer to drop out from the contest. Mixed equilibria arise then. We postpone the
analysis of mixed strategies to Section 5.
Figure 1 illustrates the two scenarios characterized in Proposition 2 for the case
n = 2 and linear impact. The lines depict the players’best response functions. The
increasing sections correspond to the case where the opponent is making little effort
and the best response is to make an effort x < x̃(2) that just ensures victory (hence
the intercept at 1
β
). The non-increasing positive segments correspond to effort level
x̃(2). When the opponent becomes very aggressive, though, the best response is to
remain inactive.
The solid lines correspond to the case when the conditions in Proposition 2 are
satisfied. There, players choose the optimal effort x̃(2) in equilibrium. The dashed
lines correspond to the case when conditions in Proposition 2 are not satisfied. There,
a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist because x̃(2) is so high that players prefer
to drop out when the opponent is exerting that effort. Note that the best response
functions for the two cases overlap to a large extent.
The following example illustrates these equilibria for any n.
Example 2: Logarithmic impact function. The logarithmic impact function
f(xi) = β lnxi is the only one that ensures that the success function (2) is homoge-
neous of degree zero (Cubel and Sanchez-Pages, 2016).







Because h(0) = 0, all players must be active in any pure strategy equilibrium.
Recall that equilibrium existence requires that all players enjoy a non-negative payoff;
otherwise they would prefer to remain inactive. Formally, this amounts simply to
β ≤ 1
n−1 . In other words, a full activity equilibrium exists if the sensitivity of the
impact function to effort is not too high compared to the marginal cost of effort.
Otherwise, competition becomes too fierce and the pure strategy equilibrium breaks
down.
Equilibrium equivalence with rank-order tournaments. Next we show
that difference-form success functions are very related to rank-order tournaments.13
Following Lazear and Rosen (1981), suppose that the performance of contestant i is
given by
yi = xi + εi,
where εi is an idiosyncratic random additive shock. Shocks are drawn from the same
distribution with density function g and differentiable cumulative function G. In the
literature, it is often assumed that these shocks have zero mean. We do so below for
the sake of exposition, but results in this subsection would go through if we assumed
otherwise.
Contestant i wins the rank-order tournament if and only if yi > yj for all j 6= i,
that is, if her performance is above everybody else’s. The probability of contestant i
winning the tournament is




G(xi − xj + t)dG(t).
Assume all contestants in the tournament value the prize at v and that the cost
of effort is given by the strictly increasing and differentiable function c(xi). Consider
a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium x∗ > 0. The expected payoff of contender i





G(xi − x∗ + t)n−1dG(t)− c(xi).




G(t)n−2g(t)dG(t)− c′(x∗) = 0.
Given our assumptions on c(xi), a solution to this equation exists and is unique.
Thus, a unique symmetric equilibrium exists. We next characterize the conditions
13This connection was first acknowledged in Che and Gale (2000, p. 24).
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under which that symmetric equilibrium is equivalent to the equilibrium of the sym-
metric difference-form contest characterized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 [Equivalence with rank-order tournaments]. Assume
that the impact function is linear and the conditions in Proposition 2 hold. Then, the
pure strategy equilibrium of the symmetric difference form-contest is equivalent to the
equilibrium of a rank-order tournament with an additive random shock distributed
with cdf G(t) = eβt−1 and support (−∞, 1
β
].
Proof. First, note that when the random shock has cdf G(t) = eβt−1 and support
(−∞, 1
β


















which is the first order condition for the interior symmetric equilibrium in the difference-
form contest with linear impact assuming that conditions in Proposition 2 hold. If
vβ n−1
n
< c′(0), all players remain inactive in the symmetric equilibrium of both games.
This proposition shows that if shocks follow a generalized type-III extreme value
distribution14 -also called negative Weibull-, with zero mean and variance 1/β2, the
rank-order tournament and the symmetric difference-form contest are equilibrium
equivalent. This equivalence arises naturally because the generalized type-III extreme
value distribution is the limit distribution of the maximum of a sequence of indepen-
dent and identically distributed random variables. In the symmetric equilibrium, the
probability of winning the tournament is entirely determined by the probability of
the shock being the largest among all players’. That is also why Ryvkin and Drugov
(2017) find that the symmetric Tullock (ratio) contest is equilibrium equivalent to a
rank-order tournament with additive shocks distributed following a type-I extreme
value distribution, another maximum limit distribution.
Before closing this section, let us note that the variance of the negative Weibull
is 1/β2. That is, as the sensitivity parameter β increases, noise disappears and the
measure of performance becomes more accurate. In the limit, when β →∞, both the
rank-order tournament and the difference-form contest approach the all-pay auction
as the player with the highest effort wins with certainty.
14See Jenkinson (1955) for an early reference.
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4. The asymmetric case
Let us now turn our attention to the case where contestants hold different valuations.
The CSF in (2) already hints that players with lower valuations will remain inactive.
We next characterize the equilibria in pure strategies where multiple heterogeneous
contestants are active.
When valuations are heterogenous, the FOC associated to the optimization prob-







′(xi)− c′(xi) = 0.
Again, note that the separability of the contest success function implies that the
solution to this problem does not depend directly on the effort of other players. This
solution is
x̃i(n




We refer to the level of effort x̃i(n∗) as the preferred effort choice of contestant
i. This preferred effort choice is strictly positive if and only if vi > n
∗
n∗−1h(0). It is
non-decreasing in the valuation of victory vi, implying x̃i(n∗) ≥ x̃i+1(n∗), and in n∗,
i.e. x̃i(n∗) ≤ x̃i(n∗ + 1).
Although the preferred effort choice of a player does not depend on the effort
of others, her best response does. Even if x̃i(n∗) > 0, contestant i will prefer to
remain inactive if the rest of contenders exert suffi ciently high effort. Note also that
a contender with a low valuation of victory so that x̃i(n∗) = 0 can still enjoy a
positive winning probability in equilibrium if the rest of contenders have relatively
low valuations and make low enough efforts.
Figure 2 illustrates these scenarios for n = 2 and linear impact. The solid lines
are the best response functions of the two players corresponding to the case where a
pure strategy equilibrium exists; players make effort x̃i(2) in that equilibrium. The
dashed best response function corresponds to the case where player 2’s valuation has
decreased and effort x̃2(2) is not enough to obtain a positive payoff when player 1
chooses x̃1(2) (note that her best response functions partially overlap). In that case,
any equilibrium must be in mixed strategies. We will come back to this in Section
5.2.
Hopefully, it should have become clear to the reader at this point that the char-
acterization of pure strategy equilibria hinges on the characterization of the number
of contenders with positive winning probabilities n∗ and the number of active con-
tenders n∗∗. Given the preferred effort choices of the n∗∗ active contenders when
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Figure 2: Figure 2: Best responses for the asymmetric case with n = 2 and linear
impact.
n∗ contenders have pi > 0, it must be that precisely n∗ contenders enjoy a positive
winning probability under the strategy profile in which n∗∗ contestants are active and
exert their preferred effort choice.
Let us now characterize conditions under which such pure strategy equilibria exist.
Proposition 4 [Pure strategy equilibria with heterogeneous players]. Assume
h(xi) is strictly increasing and that v1 ≥ nn−1h(0). Then, the generalized difference-
form contest admits the following pure strategy equilibria:
(i) An equilibrium with n∗∗ = n∗ = 1 when v2 < 2h(0) and
f(x̃1(n)) ≥ 1 + f(0);
(ii) Equilibria with n∗∗ < n∗ = n when vn∗∗+1 < nn−1h(0) ≤ vn∗∗ and
n∗∗∑
i=1
f(x̃i(n)) ≤ 1 + n∗∗f(0); (12)
(iii) Equilibria with 2 ≤ n∗∗ = n∗ ≤ n when vn∗∗+1 < n
∗∗











Proof. Player 1 has the highest incentive to deviate from an equilibrium where








n−1h(0). This ensures that
at least player 1 has an incentive to exert positive effort.
Let us now study equilibria where n∗∗ ≥ 1. We first characterize the conditions
under which an equilibrium with only one active player exists, i.e. n∗ = n∗∗ = 1.











The solution is x∗1 = min{f−1(1 + f(0)), x̃1(n)}. Note that p∗1 = 1 only when
x̃1(n) ≥ f−1(1+f(0)), which is the same as f(x̃1(n)) ≥ 1+f(0). In addition, we need
that v2 < 2h(0); otherwise player 2 would like to become active. These conditions
are summarized in part (i) of the text of the Proposition.
Let us now construct an equilibrium where n∗∗ < n∗ = n. This is an equilibrium
where n − n∗∗ players remain inactive but all enjoy a positive winning probability.
















Rewriting (14), and combining it with (15) and x̃n∗∗(n∗∗) > 0 produces the con-
ditions stated in part (ii) of the text of the proposition.
The last type of equilibrium is one where 2 ≤ n∗ = n∗∗. For that equilibrium to
exist a necessary condition is vn∗∗+1 < n
∗∗
n∗∗−1h(0). Otherwise, at least player n
∗∗ + 1
would deviate and become active. The second necessary condition is that x̃n∗∗(n∗∗) >
0, which is equivalent to vn∗∗ ≥ n
∗∗
n∗∗−1h(0). The last condition is that player n
∗∗
does not prefer to deviate from x̃n∗∗(n∗∗) and become inactive. As in the proof of





∗∗)) ≤ 1 + (n∗∗ − 1)f(0), (16)
is satisfied, then player n∗∗ enjoys a positive winning probability by being inactive
when players i < n∗∗ make effort x̃i(n∗∗). But then u′n∗∗(0, {x̃i(n∗∗)}n
∗∗−1
i=1 , {0}i≥n∗∗) >
0 because we have already imposed that vn∗∗ ≥ n
∗∗
n∗∗−1h(0). This implies that x̃n∗∗(n
∗∗)




If condition (16) does not hold, x̃n∗∗(n∗∗) might be just a local maximum. The
reason is that the rest of active players are so aggressive that player n∗∗ may obtain
a negative payoff by making effort x̃n∗∗(n∗∗). Her preferred effort choice is a best
response if and only if
un∗∗({x̃i(n∗∗)}n
∗∗









All these conditions jointly characterize the equilibrium in part (iii) of the text
of the Proposition.
Proposition 4 shows that pure strategy equilibria with multiple players can be
of two types: First, an equilibrium where all contestants enjoy a positive winning
probability but only a subset of them are active. This equilibrium exists when the
highest valuations are low enough so that the rest of contestants still enjoy a positive
winning probability when these high-valuation players make their preferred effort
choice. Second, an equilibrium where the set of active players coincides with the
set of contestants who have a positive winning probability, i.e. n∗∗ = n∗. That
equilibrium exists when the players with the highest valuations make enough effort
to preempt the rest from becoming active. In addition, the set of active players must
have relatively similar valuations among them so that none of them prefer to drop
out. These equilibria are realistic in the sense that contenders with lower valuations
remain inactive whereas those with higher valuations participate in the contest.
In addition, Proposition 4 reiterates that the full preemption result in Che and
Gale (2000) breaks down as soon as full linearity is dropped. Some, even all, con-
tenders can be active in equilibrium if they have high enough valuations relative to
those of their opponents. To see this, consider the following corollary to Proposition
4.
Corollary 1: If h(0) = 0, then n∗∗ = n in any pure strategy equilibrium.
For full activity to be an equilibrium when h(0) = 0, vn must be high enough so
that effort x̃n(n) awards player n a positive payoff when competing against the rest
of players. Note the contrast with the pure strategy equilibria of the fully linear case
characterized in Proposition 1. There player 2 had to value victory not too much,
i.e. v2 < 2β , for a pure strategy equilibrium (with preemption) to exist whereas here
a pure strategy equilibrium (with full activity) exists only when vn is high enough.
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Let us illustrate this contrast and the pure strategy equilibria characterized in
Proposition 4 with the following example.





where φ ≥ 0. This function encompasses as a particular case the linear cost function
when φ = 0. Moreover, c′(0) = 1 for all φ.
When, in addition, the impact function is linear, the preferred effort of player i is
x̃i(n
















v1v2 is the geometric mean of the valuations of the contestants with the
two highest valuations. In other words, a pure strategy equilibrium with full activity
exists as long as the two contestant with the highest valuations value victory not
too highly relative to the third player.15 The geometric mean will reappear in our
analysis of inequality and total contest expenditures in Section 5.1.







In words, this equilibrium exists if and only if the two players with the highest
valuations do not value victory so much as to ensure the defeat of the third one when
she remains inactive.
Figure 3 illustrates the regions of the parameter space for the case n = 3 provided
that v3 < 32β . In the white areas, the pure strategy equilibrium breaks down. In the
white area on the left, the equilibrium must be in mixed strategies because player 1
and 2 value victory enough to defeat player 3 for sure, but player 2 has a relatively
low valuation and no incentive to make a positive effort against player 1 alone. The
other white area corresponds to the case where player 2 has a high enough valuation
so her preferred effort choice is positive when competing against player 1 but this
level of effort is not high enough to secure a positive payoff. We explore the resulting
mixed-strategy equilibria in the next section.
15Note that the right hand side of the expression is increasing in v3 whenever v3 ≥ 32β .
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Figure 3: Equilibria for Example 3 when v3 < 32β .
5. Further results
In this section, we derive some additional results. First, we study how the level of
total expenditures in the contest under the pure strategy equilibrium characterized
above varies with the heterogeneity in players’valuations. Then, we explore a mixed
strategy equilibrium that exists in the region of the parameter space where pure
strategy equilibria fail to exist.
5.1. Heterogeneity and total contest expenditures. Next we explore how
heterogeneity in players’valuations affects aggregate expenditures in difference-form
contests. In Tullock contests, Cornes and Hartley (2005) showed that total expendi-
tures decrease with heterogeneity when the cost of effort is a power function whereas
Ryvkin (2013) uncovered a much more complex relationship for general cost functions
depending on their curvature. Similarly, we show in what follows that the relation-
ship between aggregate effort and heterogeneity in difference-form contests depends
on the convexity or concavity of the function h(xi).
First, we need to establish a criterion to compare distributions of valuations. To
that end, we employ the well-known Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. That is, we
explore changes in the valuation of one player accompanied by a change of identical
magnitude but opposed sign in the valuation of another player whilst keeping their
ranking in the valuation distribution unchanged. We perform a progressive (regres-
sive) change when the player whose valuation decreases has a higher (lower) valuation
than the contestant whose valuation increases. According to the Pigou-Dalton prin-
ciple of transfers, the resulting distribution is more equal (less heterogeneous) than
the original one. After performing a progressive change, the resulting distribution of
20
valuations Lorenz dominates the original one.
The following proposition compares the total level of contest expenditures after a
progressive change in valuations which leaves n∗constant.
Proposition 5 [Heterogeneity and total effort]. Consider a valuation distribu-
tion v under which n∗ players enjoy a positive winning probability and n∗∗ ≥ 2 out
of them are active in equilibrium. Perform a progressive change in v between any
two players i, j ≤ n∗∗ such that n∗ and n∗∗ remain unchanged. The total equilibrium
level of effort increases (decreases) as a result if and only if h(xi) is convex (concave).




















′ is the valuation distribution resulting














The effect of small changes that make the valuation distribution more egalitarian
depend on the shape of the impact and cost function. The intuition is that if the
cost function is very convex or the impact function very concave, players with higher
valuations exert relatively low effort in equilibrium. In that case, a progressive change
makes the lower valuation player increase her effort more than the higher valuation
player decreases her own.
We can use this result to study how the equilibrium number of players with positive
winning probabilities changes in response to a progressive change in the distribution
of valuations.
Proposition 6 [Heterogeneity and winning probabilities]. Assume that the im-
pact function is linear. Consider a valuation distribution v under which n∗ is the
equilibrium number of players with positive probability, n∗∗ out of them are active.
Perform a progressive change in v between any two players i, j < n∗∗ which leaves
n∗∗ unchanged. Denote by n′ the number of players with positive probability under
the new distribution v′. Then n′ ≤ n∗ (n′ ≥ n∗) when h(xi) is convex (concave).
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∗ + 1) < 0.
Note that the negative term in the first expression contains the total level of
contest expenditures. Hence, we can apply Proposition 5 to establish that the left
hand side of the first equation decreases when moving from v to v′ when h is convex.
This implies that n′ ≤ n∗. By the same token, the left hand side of the second
expression increases when moving from v to v′ when h is concave, so n′ ≥ n∗ as a
result.
The intuition of this result is similar to the one for Proposition 5: When the cost
function is quite convex or the impact function very concave, a progressive change
in valuations increases the level of overall competition. This makes lower valuation
players less likely to secure a positive payoff with their preferred effort choice.
The following example illustrates how the shape of the h function determines the
impact on the total level of contest expenditures of a more egalitarian distribution of
valuations.
Example 4: Isoelastic cost. Consider the isoelastic cost function c(xi) = 11+φx
1+φ
i
where φ ≥ 0. The case φ = 0 corresponds to the linear cost case. Assume the impact
function is linear. Then, h(xi) is strictly convex (concave) if φ > (<)1.
Suppose there are three players with valuations v = (4, 2, 2
3
) and β = 1
2
. Consider
first the case φ = 1
2




Consider now a rank-preserving progressive change in v such that v′1 = 4 − ∆ and
v′2 = 2 + ∆ where ∆ ∈ [0, 1]. If ∆ ≤ 13 , it is still the case that n
∗ = 2 and the total




2], which is decreasing in ∆.
That is, total effort decreases as the valuation distribution becomes more egalitarian.
If ∆ > 1
3
, players 1 and 2 become less competitive and the number of contenders with
positive winning probability increases to n∗ = 3.
Now assume the same v, β = 3
4
and φ = 1.9 so h(xi) is strictly convex. In
equilibrium, p∗ = (0.66, 0.33, 0.01) and n∗ = 3. Perform a progressive change as
before. As long as ∆ . 0.23, n∗ = 3 in equilibrium and the total level of contest










1.9 ], which is increasing in ∆;
total effort increases as the distribution of valuations becomes more egalitarian. If
∆ > 0.23, players 1 and 2 become so competitive that the number of contenders with
positive probability drops to n∗ = 2.
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5.2. Mixed strategies. We now turn our attention to the region of the parameter
space where pure strategy equilibria fail to exist. Recall that n∗∗ = n∗ ≤ n cannot
be an equilibrium when two conditions are met: First, that the valuation of player
n∗∗ is not high enough relative to those of players with higher valuations than her;
in that case, her preferred effort choice x̃n∗∗(n∗∗) does not guarantee her a positive
payoff and she prefers to drop out. Second, it is the case that contestant n∗∗ has an
incentive to become active when n∗∗ − 1 players are active, i.e. x̃n∗∗(n∗∗ − 1) > 0,
so n∗∗ − 1 cannot be a pure strategy equilibrium either. Hence, the equilibrium can
only be in mixed strategies.
The next lemma provides two general results about any mixed strategy equilibria
of our contest game.
Lemma 2: Assume the impact function is linear and h(0) = 0. In any mixed strategy
equilibrium, at least one player is fully active and at most n− 2 players remain fully
inactive. Moreover, any player who puts probability mass at zero must earn a zero
payoff.
Proof. For the first part of the statement, suppose by contradiction that all players
put a probability mass at zero, so the event where all players remain inactive occurs
with positive probability. Then, any player could increase her effort from zero to






ε in that event. Since
h(0) = 0 implies c′(0) = 0, this deviation is profitable. Now suppose that all but one
player remain fully inactive. If that active player wins with probability pi < 1, the
marginal benefit of effort for all the other players j ≥ i is β n−1
n
vj at zero, which is
thus greater than c′(0), so they would deviate. If the only active player is winning
with probability one, it must be that xi = 1β . The marginal benefit of effort for any
inactive player who becomes active would then be β
2
vj > 0. Hence, any player would
prefer to deviate and become active.
For the second statement, suppose on the contrary that the payoff of the player
who puts probability mass at zero is positive. This can only occur if the expected
bid of the opponents E[x∗−i] is such that pi(0, E[x
∗
−i]) > 0. This implies that the
expected marginal benefit of increasing effort from zero to ε > 0 is positive, i.e.
β n
∗−1
n∗ vi. Because c
′(0) = 0, such deviation would be profitable. Hence, i must be
earning a zero payoff in equilibrium.
Che and Gale (2000) characterized two types of mixed strategy equilibria in two-
player fully linear difference-form contests: An overlapping equilibrium where the
two players put some probability mass at zero, and a staggered equilibrium in which
the players put mass at a number of points separated by a fixed length and the
player with the lowest valuation puts some mass at zero. The lemma above shows
that an overlapping equilibrium cannot exist in generalized difference-form contests
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when h(0) = 0. That type of equilibrium is thus an artifact of cost linearity. When
h(0) = 0, players have an incentive to be fully active when the rest of players put
some probability mass at zero.
It is possible to write down a system of equations that characterizes a candidate
staggered mixed equilibrium of the generalized difference-form contest. But unlike
in Che and Gale (2000), these equations are non-linear and it is thus not possible to
obtain a general existence result. Because a full characterization of mixed equilibria
is out of the scope of this paper, we focus our attention to the case where the impact
function is linear and the cost function is quadratic. This case illustrates well how that
staggered mixed equilibria would look like: The player with the highest valuation is
active with probability one, the player with the second highest valuation randomizes
between her preferred effort choice and inactivity, and the rest of players remain fully
inactive.
Proposition 7. Assume impact is linear, the cost is quadratic and c(x̃2(2)) < v2
but (13) is not satisfied for n∗∗ = 2. Then a mixed strategy equilibrium exists which
satisfies the following properties:














and remains inactive otherwise;
(iii) Players i = 3, ..., n remain fully inactive;
(iv) Player 1’s expected payoff is v1(1 − π c(x̃2(2))v2 ) − c(κ1) whereas the rest of con-
testants earn zero.
Proof. For the time being suppose that the contest has only two players, 1 and
2. Recall from Proposition 4 that a mixed strategy equilibrium must exist when
v2 ≥ 2h(0) but (13) is not satisfied for n∗∗ = 2; for the case with linear impact and
















In words, v1 is so high relative to v2 that x̃2(2) does not guarantee player 2 a higher
payoff than inactivity against x̃1(2). But inactivity is not a best response either for
player 2 either because v2 ≥ 2h(0) = 0 and she would like to become active when
only player 1 is active.
Now, consider the strategy profile described in the text of the proposition. Player
2 makes effort x̃2(2) with some probability π and remains inactive with the remaining
probability 1−π.With some abuse of notation, denote this strategy profile simply as
κ2. On the other hand, consider a pure strategy κ1 for player 1 where κ1 is such that
p2(κ1, x̃2(2)) ∈ [0, 1] and p2(κ1, 0) = 0. Note that we are not including the vector
of zero efforts corresponding to players i ≥ 3 as we are for the time being assuming
there are only two contenders.
For the proposed profile {κ1,κ2} to constitute a mixed strategy equilibrium,
player 2 must be indifferent between exerting effort x̃2(2) and remaining inactive.
That is, κ1 must be such that
u2(κ1, x̃2(2)) = u2(κ1, 0);



















Next we need to check that it is indeed the case that 1 ≥ p2(κ1, x̃2(2)) ≥ 0 =










Given the definition of κ1 in (19), the second inequality holds automatically. Note
that κ1 ≥ 1β also holds automatically because of (19). Finally note κ1 ≥
β
2
v2 − 1β if
and only if c(x̃2(2)) ≤ v2, which we impose.
Let us now check whether κ1 is indeed a best response to κ2. To do that, we need
to show that x1 = κ1 maximizes player 1’s payoff function globally when player 2
follows strategy κ2. Before writing this payoff function, recall that when impact is
linear, a player wins (loses) with certainty when her effort is at least 1
β
units higher
(lower) than her opponent’s.
u1(x1,κ2) =



















v1 − c(x1) if x1 ≥ 1β + x̃2(2).
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which holds automatically because of (17) and (19).
We now need to make sure that κ1 is also a global maximum, which entails
discarding other candidates:
(i) Consider first the case x1 < min{ 1β , x̃2(2) −
1
β
}. Denote as x′1 the candidate for
global optimum in that interval when π = 2
βv1
κ1. This effort must satisfy
(1− π)β v1
2
= c′(x′1)⇒ x′1 = β
v1
2








For x′1 to be a global maximum, it must satisfy x
′


























































(ii) For x1 ∈ [x̃2(2)− 1β ,
1
β
) the local maximum would be x̃1(2) as the marginal benefit
of effort for player 1 would be again β
2




, leading to a contradiction.




candidate local maximum here is x′1 = 1/β. Note that the payoff function has










)⇔ π ≤ 1− 2
β2v1




leading to a contradiction since we impose c(x̃2(2)) < v2 which is equivalent to
κ1 > x̃2(2)− 1β .
(iv) For x1 ≥ 1β + x̃2(2) the payoff function is again decreasing. The candidate local
maximum is thus x′1 =
1
β
+ x̃2(2). The payoff function is again non-differentiable
here so for this to be the optimum u′1(
1
β
+ x̃2(2),κ2) ≥ 0 when approached from
below 1
β











which contradicts the very definition of κ1. Since we have exhausted all other
candidates for a global maximum, κ1 is the best response to κ2
The final step of the proof is to show that no player i ≥ 3 would like to deviate
and become active when players 1 and 2 are using strategies {κ1,κ2}. To do that we
follow the same strategy as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Alcalde and Dahm (2010)
as our success function also satisfies the monotonicity and anonymity properties they
imposed on their CSF.16
More specifically, consider the case where some player i ≥ 3 plays some pure
strategy x′ > 0. Note that our CSF implies that the expected winning probability of
player i in that case satisfies
πpi(κ1, x̃2(2), x′)+(1−π)pi(κ1, 0, x′) = πp2(κ1, x′, x̃2(2))+(1−π)p2(κ1, x′, 0) ≤ p2(κ1, x′),
where, to simplify notation, we are leaving out {0}j 6=i,j≥3, the vector of zero efforts
of all contestants different from players 1, 2 and i. The equality comes from applying
16Monotonicity is one of the axioms characterizing our CSF (Cubel and Sanchez-Pages, 2016).
Anonimity is satisfied because (2) assumes in addition that impact functions are identical across
players.
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the anonymity property of the CSF and the inequality from applying monotonicity.
Given that v2 ≥ vi for i ≥ 3 then
ui(κ1,κ2, x′) = vi[πpi(κ1, x̃2(2), x′) + (1− π)pi(κ1, 0, x′)]− c(x′)
≤ v2p2(κ1, x′)− c(x′)
= u2(κ1, x′) ≤ u2(κ1,κ2) = 0,
where the very last inequality holds from the fact that κ2 is player 2’s best response
to κ1. Hence, player i ≥ 3 cannot gain from becoming active.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have offered the first systematic study of multi-player contests where
winning probabilities depend on the difference between participants’effective efforts.
These contests are well suited to describe a wide variety of situations where a set
of agents compete for an object or award. These include military combat, union-
firm conflicts, influence activities within organization and political lobbying within
federal countries. We have shown that there exists a natural connection between
these contests and rank-order tournaments à la Lazear and Rosen (1981).
Our main result is that the non-existence of pure strategy equilibria and the full
preemption phenomenon observed in the previous literature rested critically on the
assumption of full linearity. This was to be expected. The lack of robustness of
predictions under linear costs has been shown to apply to other families of contests.
That said, partial preemption may take place in equilibrium when full linearity is
abandoned. This is because the difference-form CSF can award a positive winning
probability to inactive players. But we see this result as realistic. In many real-
world environments, some contenders remain inactive: Not all countries engage in
warfare nor all employees engage in influence activities. Partial preemption is indeed
a real-world phenomenon.
Further research should deepen our understanding of difference-form contests.
One avenue is the study of group contests, which we undertake in a companion paper
(Cubel and Sanchez-Pages, 2014). Another open avenue would be along the lines of
Baye and Hoppe (2003), namely, to study the strategic equivalence of these contests
with other well-known competitive games. Finally, a full characterization of mixed
equilibria remains pending. We would have liked to study the limiting behavior of
these equilibria when the sensitivity of effort differentials becomes arbitrarily large.
Che and Gale (2000) did this under full linearity and showed that equilibrium payoffs
converge to those of the all-pay auction (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye, Kovenock
and de Vries, 1996).17 But the problem becomes quite intractable for the generalized
17Alcalde and Dahm (2010) show this for a class of contests that contains Tullock contests as a
special case; see also Ewerhart (2017) for Tullock contests.
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case. Still, the system of equations characterizing the staggered mixed equilibrium
in Section 5.2 suggests that the points where players put positive mass must become
increasingly close as the sensitivity increases, even closer for higher levels of effort.
This is in consistent with the convex cumulative distribution functions characterizing
the mixed strategy equilibrium of the all-pay auction under convex costs (Kaplan and
Wettstein, 2006).
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